Theory and Intuition by McCullough, E. A., Jr.
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
Faculty Honor Lectures Lectures 
4-7-1981 
Theory and Intuition 
E. A. McCullough Jr. 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/honor_lectures 
 Part of the Chemistry Commons 
Recommended Citation 
McCullough, E. A. Jr., "Theory and Intuition" (1981). Faculty Honor Lectures. Paper 59. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/honor_lectures/59 
This Presentation is brought to you for free and open 
access by the Lectures at DigitalCommons@USU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Honor Lectures by 
an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. 
For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
"d 
~ 
co 
:>-. 
H 
o 
Q)N 
Lf"),..c: 
_ I..OH :>-. 
N 0.. 
o 0 
0"1 ~ U 
9.2 
no.65 
Theory and Intuition 
by 
E. A. McCullough, Jr. 
65th Faculty Honor Lecture 
Utah State University 
Logan, Utah 
.. 
SIXTY-FIFTH HONOR LECTURE 
DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY 
A basic objective of the Faculty Association of Utah State Univer-
sity, in the words of its constitution, is: 
to encourage intellectual growth and development of its members 
by sponsoring and arranging for the publication of two annual 
faculty research lectures in the fields of (1) the biological and 
exact sciences, including engineering, called the Annual Faculty 
Honor Lecture in the Natural Sciences; and (2) the humanities 
and social sciences, including education and business administra-
tion, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Humanities. 
The administration of the University is sympathetic with these 
aims and shares, through the Scholarly Publications Committee, the 
costs of publishing and distributing these lectures. 
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty 
Association. Among the factors considered by the committee in choos-
ing lecturers, are in the words of the constitution: 
(1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; (2) 
publication of research through recognized channels in the field 
of the proposed lecture; (3) outstanding teaching over an 
extended period of years ; (4) personal influence in developing the 
character of the students. 
E.A. McCullough, Jr. , was selected by the committee to deliver 
the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Sciences. On behalf of the 
members of the Association we are happy to present Professor McCul-
lough's paper. 
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by 
E. A. McCullough, Jr. * 
Among the practitioners of science are people who are called 
theorists , and this lecture is concerned with the question, Just what is it 
that a theorist does? 
If an experimentalist does experiments, then a theorist 
presumably does theories. What is a theory? My dictionary defines it as 
". . . a system of assumptions, accepted principles, or rules of pro· 
cedure devised to analyze, predict or otherwise explain the nature or 
behavior of a specified set of phenomena."1 
Those who now understand perfectly what a theorist does may 
stop reading here because everything that follows will be superfluous. 
For those who are still somewhat in the dark, the rest of this lecture 
will attempt to explain, in rather more concrete terms, just what it 
means to be a theorist. Of course, I cannot presume to speak for all 
theorists; therefore, I am going to discuss only what it means to be a 
theorist within the context of my own specialty, theoretical chemistry. 
Since I occasionally encounter people who seem to feel that 
"theoretical" is synonymous with "lacking any practical utility," I also 
want to indicate why such is not the case, at least for theoretical 
chemistry. To put it another way, I hope to correct the misperception 
about theorists perhaps best expressed by my mother when she 
exclaimed, "You mean you get paid to do that?" 
What does it mean to do theoretical chemistry? Let me begin by 
sketching very roughly what chemistry is. Science has been divided 
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into a number of subdisciplines: physics, chemistry, biology, etc. The 
boundaries between subdisciplines are somewhat arbitrary and often 
fuzzy, yet one can usually recognize the subdisciplines by the basic 
assumptions they employ and the phenomena they admit for con-
sideration. 
The principal axiom of chemistry is the atomic hypothesis: 
(1) most of the material contents of the universe are composed of very 
tiny entities called atoms ; (2) each atom consists of a certain number 
of negatively charged electrons moving about a positively charged 
nucleus ; and (3) although there are approximately one hundred fun-
damentally different kinds of atoms, they can combine with each 
other to form molecules in an enormous number of ways. The inter-
pretation of natural phenomena in terms of atoms and molecules 
essentially defines the subdiscipline of chemistry. 
To clarify what chemistry is , it may be helpful to consider some 
examples of what it isn't. At the one extreme, any phenomenon whose 
interpretation depends on knowing what an electron is, or on knowing 
what a nucleus is made of, isn't chemistry. All we need for chemistry 
are a few properties of electrons and nuclei. 2 Questions about why they 
have these properties are not chemical questions, not because they are 
uninteresting, but because they are unnecessary for chemistry. 
Instead, such questions belong in another subdiscipline, physics. 
At the other extreme, consider biology. Biologists made con-
siderable progress without ever having to invoke the assumption that 
living things were made of atoms. For example, the principles of 
genetics were worked out without this assumption. However, this 
example also illustrates the arbitrariness of dividing science into sub-
disciplines because we have since discovered an atomic interpretation 
of genetics in terms of the molecular structure of DNA. In fact, the 
atomic interpretation of biology has become so prevalent and fruitful 
that it has spawned a whole new subdiscipline, biochemistry. 
Having more or less established the definitional boundaries of 
chemistry, we can proceed to theoretical chemistry. In defining 
theory, I wish to adopt the following abbreviated but much sharper 
version of the dictionary definition quoted earlier: A theory is a system 
of rules for predicting the behavior of a specified set of phenomena. If 
the specified phenomena belong to the subdiscipline of chemistry, we 
have a theory of chemistry. The choice of "predict" rather than 
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"explain" is very important. A rule that can explain but cannot 
predict is not really a theory in the scientific sense. 
In many contexts, the term rules carries absolutist or dogmatic 
connotations, but such connotations are definitely not intended in 
scientific usage. Indeed, the one absolute in science is that there are no 
absolutes. The scientific "truth" of any theory is determined solely by 
the agreement between the predictions of the theory and experimental 
observations. This appeal to experimental evidence is precisely what 
distinguishes scientific truth from many other kinds of truth. 
Therefore, the term rules should be read as "instructions" or even as 
"recipe. " 
The strength of any theory is measured by testing the scope and 
the precision of its predictions. The latter test means that ultimately 
we are seeking rules that predict the behavior of phenomena quan-
titatively. Mathematics is our most useful language for expressing 
quantitative statements precisely and concisely. Consequently, our 
strongest theories are expressed often most simply in mathematical 
terms. The converse isn't necessarily true, of course. The mere fact 
that a theory can be expressed mathematically doesn't make the 
theory strong. This fact is easy to forget in an era of computers. A 
computer certainly can be used to derive the predictions of any theory 
if the rules of the theory can be expressed in a suitable mathematical 
form. Once the rules have been programmed into the computer, the 
computer usually can derive the predictions much faster and more 
reliably than could any human. This use of computers is indispensable 
in many areas of theoretical research - theoretical chemistry, 
especially - but it does nothing to increase the validity of the theory. 
As the computer scientist Joseph Weizenbaum has remarked, " If 
astrology is nonsense, then computerized astrology is just as surely 
nonsense. " 3 
I now wish to address the question, What does it mean to be a 
theorist? If a theory is a set of rules for predicting the behavior of a 
specified set of phenomena, ostensibly the fundamental problem for 
theorists is to discover what are the rules. This is indeed the fun-
damental problem; but, surprisingly, it is not the task that occupies 
most theorists, and certainly not theoretical chemists. In fact, 
theoretical chemists never have to confront this problem, for the sim-
ple reason that the rules of chemistry are already knownl 
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Astonishing as it may seem, this statement is absolutely correct, as 
far as we know. To have the rules of chemistry means to have the rules 
for the behavior of atoms and molecules, and we believe we have those 
rules. Furthermore, these same rules must be applicable to the 
behavior of any phenomenon that can be reduced to the behavior of 
atoms and molecules, which is almost everything from atoms on up. It 
certainly includes those phenomena comprising the subdisciplines of 
chemistry, biology, geology, and most of astronomy and physics as 
well. 
Two questions come to mind immediately. First, do we have the 
rules for everything? The answer is no. For example, we have no 
theory that predicts all the properties of an electron. (There are many 
other examples.) Discovering the rules for these phenomena is the task 
a very small group of theorists have set for themselves. They are 
theoretical physicists working at the frontiers of fundamental physics. 
These pioneers are by and large regarded as the superstars by other 
theorists. In a very real sense, they create the world we live in. 
The second question is, Why are there any other theorists? If we 
have the complete rules of chemistry, why do we need theoretical 
chemists? Indeed, why do we need any chemists at all? A complete 
theory of chemistry can predict the outcome of any chemical reaction. 
Of course, it may still be desirable to carry out selected chemical reac-
tions in order to manufacture something useful , but that activity is the 
domain of chemical engineering. There is certainly no reason to carry 
out a chemical reaction in order to learn something new, for if we 
already have the rules, there is nothing new to be learned. 
Although this view is actually held by some people, it is, at best, 
hopelessly simplistic. The reason is expressed very clearly by the 
theoretical physicist R. P. Feynman in his classic introductory physics 
text.' We may, says Feynman, draw an analogy between the natural 
world and a game of chess. Scientific theories are then analogous to 
the rules of chess and working out the predictions of the theories cor-
responds to playing the game. But there is a very big difference 
between knowing the rules of chess and being able to play. So it is with 
chemistry. We know the rules, but we cannot play very well. Why? 
The theoretical physicist P .A.M. Dirac, who codiscovered the rules of 
chemistry, explained it this way: 
The underlying physical laws necessary for the mathematical 
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theory of a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry are 
thus completely known, and the difficulty is only that the exact 
application of these laws leads to equations much too complicated 
to be soluble. s 
In other words, we don't understand what the rules are telling us. 
Trying to understand what the rules are telling us is the principal 
task of the vast majority of theorists. I consider this task to be inter-
esting, challenging, and important, and I would like to devote the rest 
of this lecture to describing how we go about it in the particular case of 
theoretical chemistry. 
We first need to know, what are the rules of chemistry. Actually, 
there are two complementary sets of rules of roughly equal impor-
tance. Understanding what either set is telling us is sufficiently dif-
ficult that a theoretical chemist will often specialize in one set or the 
other. 
The first set contains the rules for predicting the behavior of an 
individual molecule, given that it consists of so many electrons and 
nuclei with such and such properties (atoms are just special cases of 
molecules). These rules are known as quantum mechanics, and the 
application of them to chemistry is usually termed quantum 
chemistry. 
It may not be readily apparent why we need any rules of 
chemistry other than quantum mechanics. The reason has to do with 
statistics. Almost any chemical phenomenon of interest will involve 
contributions from the individual behavior of enormous numbers of 
molecules, of the order of a billion-billion (10 18), at least. The 
behavior of any particular molecule at any particular time may vary 
over a wide range; but we don't really care, for most purposes, what 
each molecule is doing. Usually, we are only interested in the average 
behavior of all of them at once. The rules for inferring this average 
behavior from the spectrum of behavior of an individual molecule are 
called, appropriately enough, statistical mechanics. 
Both quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics are relatively 
recent discoveries. Statistical mechanics dates from approximately the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Quantum mechanics is a child of 
the twentieth century but only barely. Born in 1900, it reached essen-
tially full maturity as the theory of atoms and molecules between 1925 
and 1929. 
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It is remarkable that the correct rules for predicting the average 
behavior of large numbers of molecules (statistical mechanics) were 
discovered before the correct rules for predicting the behavior of an 
individual molecule (quantum mechanics) . How was that possible? 
The answer is that prior to the discovery of quantum mechanics, 
theoriests believed that they already had the correct rules for predict-
ing the behavior of an individual molecule. These rules were Newto-
nian mechanics, which were laid down by Isaac Newton in 1687 and 
refined over the next two centuries into an elegant and all-powerful 
theory. In every case where these rules had been applied, they had 
worked perfectly; they correctly predicted the behavior of everything 
from billiard balls to planets. There was no reason to expect that they 
would not work just as well for molecules; but when the application to 
molecules was attempted, the predictions turned out to be wrong. 
The first evidence that classical mechanics (as Newtonian 
mechanics is now called) was incorrect on the atomic scale was 
obtained by using statistical mechanics to predict the average behavior 
of a large number of molecules which individually obeyed classical 
mechanics. Initially, the predictions worked pretty well, which 
inspired confidence not only in statistical mechanics but also in the 
atomic hypothesis. Yes, incredible as it seems to a modern chemist, as 
late as 1900 there were still eminent chemists who argued that 
although atoms and molecules were useful mental models, they were 
not real. In fact statistical mechanics was largely responsible for 
demolishing this viewpoint by showing that literal acceptance of the 
atomic hypothesis allowed one to predict observable large scale prop-
erties of matter. Unfortunately, the developers of statistical 
mechanics6 didn't know when to quit. As they pushed their predictions 
further , the agreement between theory and experiment seemed to get 
worse. It gradually became apparent that the atomic hypothesis, 
classical mechanics, and statistical mechanics were mutually incom-
patible. 
In 1900, Max Planck demonstrated that the trouble lay with 
classical mechanics, 7 the last place a nineteenth-century physicist 
would have suspected. Planck's revolutionary discovery that the 
Newtonian rules simply didn't work for atoms and molecules marked 
the dawn of quantum mechanics. For the next three decades, theorists 
searched frantically for the new rules. It all came together between 
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1925 and 1929. A particularly crucial event for chemistry occurred in 
1926. In that year, Erwin Schrodinger published a series of papers set-
ting out the fundamental new rules for predicting the behavior of 
atoms and molecules. 8 In essence, his rules can be reduced to the 
single statement 
A'V = ~ a'V 
2n at 
which is called the time-dependent Schrodinger equation . 
Before my physicist colleagues jump all over me, I should hasten 
to add that the Schrodinger equation cannot really predict all 
behavior of atoms and molecules,9 but it is certainly good enough for 
most chemical purposes. In particular, it can account for chemical 
bonding with a very high degree of accuracy. 
As a theoretical chemist specializing in quantum mechanics, my 
job is trying to understand what the Schrodinger equation is telling us. 
You may find it difficult to believe that one fairly simple looking equa-
tion could tell us anything useful , much less contain all of chemistry. 
The apparent simplicity, however, is due to our having cast the equa-
tion into a particular mathematical form specially chosen to make it 
look simple. Before considering in detail the application of this equa-
tion to chemistry, we should pause to examine the new and strange 
worldview that quantum mechanics employs. 
Whenever new rules of nature have been discovered, they have 
often required profound revisions in our way of looking at things. This 
is especially true with quantum mechanics. The revisions it requires 
might be divided into two classes: revisions of intuition and revisions of 
philosophy. 
Revisions of intuition are necessary because the predictions of 
quantum mechanics often clash violently with our intuitive expecta-
tions about the behavior of things. This is clearly illustrated by the so-
called wave-particle duality. At the fundamental level, classical 
physics recognized only two mutually exclusive categories of 
phenomena: waves and particles. For instance, an electron was a par-
ticle, whereas light was a wave. According to quantum mechanics, 
however, what we normally think of as a particle may sometimes act 
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like a wave and vice versa. Despite how bizarre and counterintuitive 
this seems to us, it is absolutely correct. Experiments exhibiting wave 
phenomena (interference, diffraction) are routinely performed with 
electrons, and a sensitive photocell can record the arrival of individual 
particles of light (photons) . Since the predictions of quantum 
mechanics are in accord with experiment while our intuition is not , it 
is our intuition that must be revised. The problem with our intuition is 
that it is basically Newtonian because the rules of quantum mechanics 
reduce to the rules of Newtonia,n mechanics in the large-scale world of 
our everyday experience. We have no direct experience of the world of 
electrons, and when we extrapolate our Newtonian intuition to that 
level, it fails. We simply must accept revisions of our intuition if we 
hope to deal with the physical world. 
Revisions of philosophy present quite a different problem. The 
philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics still provokes 
fierce debate . In this lecture, I don't wish to embark on a discussion of 
the philosophy of quantum mechanics. Many excellent books have 
been written on the subject. 10 I only wish to point out that our current, 
most widely accepted interpretation places stringent limitations on 
what we can possibly know about the world. In particular, the most we 
can know about any event is the probability, or chance, that it will 
happen. This limitation does not arise from incomplete information; 
the probability is the complete information. Obviously, this point of 
view represents a far cry from the deterministic certainty of Newtonian 
mechanics, and the philosophical implications are, to say the least, 
disquieting. 
Some people find the implications so disquieting that they cannot 
accept them. This list has included some famous scientists-Albert 
Einstein, for one. Although admitting that quantum mechanics was 
eminently successful in predicting the probabilities of events, Einstein 
could never accept that probabilities were the most that could be 
known about nature. He believed that quantum mechanics was only 
the shadow of some more complete, as-yet-undiscovered theory. 
Other people have gone in the opposite direction. Unable to 
accept an interpretation of quantum mechanics that asserts that 
natural events are inherently chancelike, they have been led to reject 
quantum mechanics altogether. I show part of an advertisement from 
a recent issue of Scientific American.11 
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T he Journal of Classical Physics 
This new journal is intended for Scientists and knowledgeable 
laypersons who feel Quantum Wave Mechanics is non-predictive 
and ultimately counterproductive and that classical model 
development is preferred. 
The assertion that quantum mechanics is "non-predictive" is simply 
wrong if the intended sense is "cannot predict the observable results of 
experiments." The predictions may be strange and the philosophical 
implications unpalatable, but quantum mechanics works extremely 
well, and it has no competitors in this regard. 
The Schrodinger equation supplies the machinery for making the 
predictions of quantum mechanics known to us. These predictions 
take the form of probabilities, the chance that an event of interest will 
occur. This probability information is contained in IJI (Greek psi, pro-
nounced "sigh"), which is called the wavefunctz·on. For a molecule, IJI 
could tell us the probability of finding the electrons arranged in a cer-
tain pattern about the nuclei at a certain time . Note that IJI does not 
tell us that we w£il find the electrons arranged in that way, only the 
chance that we will. This information is sufficient, because given the 
probabilities of all possible arrangements of electrons and nuclei , we 
can calculate any measurable property of the molecule-the energy, 
for example. So IJI is the answer, the output. 
What is the input? What determines whether we get the 
wavefunction for methane or ethane? We supply that information in 
the form of A, which is called the ham£ltonz'an operator, a hamilto-
nian for short. Methane and ethane differ because the hamiltonians 
for the two molecules differ. 
What is a hamiltonian? Unfortunately, there is no way to answer 
that question in a lecture like this . The best I can do is show one. This 
is the hamiltonian for the relatively simple molecule, diatomic 
hydrogen, H2 • 
A 122 122 H = - --( 'i7 +v ) - -( V +v )-
2MH a b 2 1 2 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
-------+-+-
ral ra2 rbl rb2 r12 rab 
Plug this hamiltonian into the Schrodinger equation, solve for IJI, and 
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you have the complete story on H 2 , according to quantum 
mechanics.12 The complexity of this hamiltonian illustrates that the 
apparent simplicity of the Schrodinger equation is deceptive. The 
equation is really far more complicated than it looks when written in 
the simple mathematical form presented earlier. 
It is, in fact, so complicated that we are unable to solve it exactly 
in nearly every case. We can only solve it exactly for one molecule. We 
can't even solve it exactly for any atoms except hydrogen. It may seem 
rather pretentious to claim that an equation that can be solved exactly 
only for one atom and one molecule contains all chemistry. How can 
we be so certain it is correct? 
There are several pieces of evidence. First, there are those few 
cases where we can obtain exact solutions. In these cases, the agree-
ment with experiment is spectacular. For example, the Schrodinger 
equation predicts the wavelengths at which the hydrogen atom 
absorbs light to an accuracy of about one part in one hundred thou· 
sand. That a natural phenomenon could be described so precisely by a 
formal mathematical equation so surprised the mathematician 
Stanislaw M. Ulam that he questioned the physicist Enrico Fermi 
about it. Fermi replied, "It has no business being that good, you know 
Stan."13 We believe in the Schrodinger equation because we don't 
believe that this level of accuracy can be accidental. (Incidentally, 
classical mechanics gives hopelessly incorrect predictions for the 
hydrogen atom.) 
A second reason for having faith in the Schrodinger equation is 
that even a rudimentary understanding of what it is telling us may 
lead to a sudden unification-one fundamental, beautifully simple 
interpretation of a whole set of previously incomprehensible 
phenomena. A classic chemical example of such a unification involved 
what Sherlock Holmes might have called The Case of the Aromatic 
Sextet. 
The Aromatic Sextet is not a musical group, but rather a term 
coined by chemists in prequantum-mechanics days. It refers to the 
unusual stability displayed by monocyclic polyenes with six pi elec-
trons. In order to explain this phenomenon, I shall have to introduce 
just a bit of organic chemistry. 
Chemists have long appreciated the unique ability of the carbon 
atom to form up to four covalent bonds. Well before the advent of 
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quantum mechanics, chemists also began to suspect that a covalent 
bond between two atoms involved a shared pair of electrons, one elec-
tron being donated by each atom. Thus, carbon must have four elec-
trons readily available to form covalent bonds. 
Suppose we take a carbon atom and bond it to a hydrogen atom, 
leaving the carbon with a residual bonding power of three. Then sup-
pose we take a number of these carbon-hydrogen units and bond the 
carbons together to form a closed ring. The resulting molecule is 
called a mono cyclic polyene. 
Problems arise when we try to draw standard chemical bond 
diagrams for these molecules. Forming one bond between each carbon 
atom and its two adjacent neighbors still leaves one unpaired electron, 
a pi electron, on each carbon. The pi electron can be used to form 
additional bonds between carbons, but not in a unique way. For 
example, with the well-known six carbon monocyclic polyene, the 
benzene molecule, we find two apparently equivalent possibilities, 
H H 
C =c 
/ "-
HC CH 
~ ~ C -c 
H H 
or 
H H 
c-c 4 ~ 
HC CH 
"- / 
C =c 
H H 
This bonding ambiguity suggests that benzene may be unusual, and it 
is. It is much more stable than chemists would have expected by 
analogy with nonring molecules of similar composition. A theory of 
the unusual stability of benzene was developed based on the bonding 
ambiguity. The equivalent diagrams were called resonance structures; 
and resonance theory postulated that the more of them you could 
draw, the more stable the compound would be, relatively speaking. 
Resonance theory broke down when applied to the five carbon 
ring. This system has one electron that cannot be paired to form a 
bond. Such a molecule is called a radical, and the unpaired electron is 
usually indicated by a dot in the bond diagram. Since this electron 
could be located on anyone of the five carbons, the cyclopentadienyl 
radical has five resonance structures. 
H 
C /., 
HC CH 
~ II 
C -c 
H H 
H 
C 
/ ~ 
HC. CH 
\ I 
C =C 
H H 
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H 
C 
-? , 
HC CH 
\ II 
C·-C 
H H 
etc. 
Resonance theory then predicts unusual stability for this radical , 
which experimentally it doesn't seem to have. However, if we add an 
extra electron, forming the negatively charged cyclopentadienyl 
anion, we do get a system of unusual stability. This is puzzling, 
because the anion has the same number of resonance structures as the 
radical , 
H H H 
C C C / .. , / ~ ~ , 
HC CH HC : e CH HC e CH etc. ~ e II \ I \ It 
c - c c = c c"- c 
H H H H H H 
Furthermore, if we now remove both electrons, leaving a positively 
charged "hole" on one carbon, we again get five , because the hole 
could be on anyone of the carbons. Yet this species, the positively 
charged cyclopentadienyl cation, is experimentally known to be very 
unstable. 
Note that both the cyclopentadienyl anion and benzene have six 
pi electrons. The almost magical stability conferred by six pi electrons 
was the source of the term "aromatic sextet" (aromatic because the 
prototype, benzene, has a characteristic odor). 
The mystery was solved by Erich Hiickel in a series of papers he 
began publishing in 1931, only five years after Schrodinger. Hiickel 
showed that a very crude application of the Schrodinger equation 
predicted that those monocyclic polyenes with six pi electrons would, 
be relatively the most stable . Due to many oversimplifications, 
Hiickel's treatment did not constitute even an approximate solution of 
the Schrodinger equation, in the sense to be discussed below. Never-
theless, he correctly showed that the pattern of stability displayed by 
the molecules is inherently contained in the Schrodinger equation. In 
fact , the pattern can be deduced almost entirely from symmetry con-
siderations. Any symmetry of the molecular framework is preserved in 
the hamiltonian. This places mathematical restrictions on the form of 
the wavefunction, which ultimately appear in the behavior of the 
molecule. These restrictions can be discovered with the mathematical 
techniques of group theory. Group theory is the closest thing to getting 
something for nothing in quantum mechanics, for by using it we can 
learn something about the wavefunction without having to solve the 
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Schrodinger equation. Huckel's treatment took proper account of the 
symmetry, so it gave the correct pattern. Refined versions of his 
approach are being pursued today. The 1981 Nobel Prize in 
Chemistry was awarded for work that built directly on the foundation 
he established. 
Huckel's work provided a qualitative understanding of what the 
Schrodinger equation could tell us for some fairly complicated 
molecules. At about the same time, others were attempting to under-
stand what it could tell us quantitatively. They studied much simpler 
systems than Huckel, but systems still far too complicated to be solved 
exactly. Their approach was to develop and apply mathematically 
sound methods for finding approximate solutions of the Schrodinger 
equation. 
There are many such methods, but they all share common 
features that distinguish them from the Huckel approach and its 
descendants. An approximate wavefunction of a certain form and 
level of approximation is selected, but then no further approximations 
are to be made. All subsequent computations are carried out as nearly 
exactly as possible to yield unambiguous numerical predictions. These 
methods are called ab initio methods. For some ab initio methods, it is 
possible to prove convergence, which means that within the chosen 
form , as the level of approximation is increased, the approximate 
wavefunction must approach, or converge to, the exact one. Such 
methods guarantee that we can obtain an answer of any desired accur-
acy simply by doing enough work. Unfortunately, for none of these 
methods is it possible to specify in advance what is "enough," and 
"enough" differs for different molecular properties. It also differs for 
different methods applied to the same molecule or the same method 
applied to different molecules. To top it off, experience has shown 
that unless we are clever, "enough" is invariably "too much" for most 
chemical problems. 
The thing that prevents us from solving the Schrodinger equation 
exactly for atoms and molecules is many electrons, where "many" 
means "more than one." The hydrogen atom, with one electron, can 
be solved exactly. The helium atom and hydrogen molecule, both with 
two, are already insoluble. Thus, it was deemed imperative to obtain 
high-accuracy approximate solutions for these two systems if quantum 
mechanics was to be taken seriously as the theory of atoms and 
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molecules. Such solutions were indeed obtained very early. Quite 
sophisticated approximate wavefunctions were employed so that 
"enough" might be achieved at a fairly low level-since it all had to be 
done by hand. The calculations of E. A. Hylleraas on helium in 1929 
and H . M. James and A. S. Coolidge on diatomic hydrogen in 1933 
preceded the development of digital computers by more than a 
decade. 
The work of James and Coolidge was especially important for 
chemistry because it demonstrated that quantum mechanics could 
describe a typical chemical bond with high accuracy. Subsequent 
calculations have carried their approach much further. The most 
recent comparison between theory and experiment indicates that 
quantum mechanics predicts the strength of the chemical bond in H2 
to an accuracy of at least five parts in one hundred thousand. a 
Although two electrons are a distinct advancement over one, it 
still falls far short of all chemistry. Unfortunately, the special methods 
developed by James and Coolidge for two electrons have proved nearly 
impossible to generalize. The mathematical complications inherent in 
their choice of approximate wavefunction are just too great, even with 
computers. We need another way. 
One possible way is to begin by asking, What makes the 
Schrodinger equation for several electrons insoluble? The answer is 
electron-electron interaction. Electrons are negatively charged; they 
repel one another. If electrons were noninteracting, an exact solution 
of the many-electron problem could be obtained by finding individual 
wavefunctions for the individual electrons instead of having to find 
one big wavefunction for all of them at once. A wavefunction for an 
individual electron is called an orbital. Although orbitals can never 
provide an exact solution for real interacting electrons, they might 
provide a decent approximation. 
It is very simple to find orbitals if we completely ignore the 
electron-electron interaction. Unfortunately, that approximation is 
too crude; it gives very poor predictions. A better approximation is to 
account for as much of the interaction as possible. It isn't possible, of 
course, to incorporate all effects due to interaction into orbitals; that 
would be tantamount to an exact solution. It turns out that the most 
we can do is include the average effects. An approximation in which 
each orbital is allowed to adjust to the average repulsive interaction 
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produced by the electrons in all other orbitals is called a self-
consistentjield or SCF approximation. 
I say "an" approximation rather than "the" approximation 
because there are many SCF approximations. They differ in how 
much freedom is permitted for the orbitals to adjust. The simplest 
approximation is to retain as many features of orbitals for noninter-
acting electrons as possible. We may insist that the orbitals preserve 
symmetry, meaning, for example, that if a particular orbital for 
noninteracting electrons is spherical, it must remain spherical for 
interacting electrons. We may also insist on using only the absolute 
minimum number of orbitals. This is not one per electron but fewer 
because two noninteracting electrons may be described by the same 
orbital. A SCF approximation in which all these features of the 
noninteracting electron problem are imposed as restrictions is called a 
restricted SCF approximation. It provides the simplest description of a 
many-electron system that at the same time accounts for as much 
electron-electron interaction as possible. 
It is not difficult to derive equations for restricted SCF orbitals, 
and these equations are much simpler than the many-electron 
Schrodinger equation. Even so, solving them is not easy, since each 
orbital depends on all the others through the average interaction. 
Although a surprising number of restricted SCF calculations on atoms 
were performed by hand, principally by D. R. Hartree and coworkers, 
the application of this approximation to molecules really had to await 
the introduction of computers. Much of the pioneering work in the 
development and computer implementation of methods for molecular 
SCF calculations was carried out by C. C. J. Roothaan and his col-
laborators in the 1950s and 1960s. Today restricted SCF calculations 
on molecules are as routine as any ab initio calculations are ever likely 
to become. They have even been performed on the guanine-cytosine 
base pair of DNA, a system with twenty-nine nuclei and one hundred 
thirty-six electrons. 
How good is the restricted SCF approximation? Qualitatively, it is 
very good. It predicts the structure of the periodic table and the 
relative strengths of most chemical bonds very well. In fact, the expla-
nation of these two subjects that we present to our students in 
freshman chemistry is based essentially on this approximation. Quan-
titatively, the best restricted SCF approximation is the one that puts 
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no limitations on the adjustment of the orbitals other than those 
already inherent in the definition of "restricted." Experience shows 
that "a best restricted" SCF calculation will typically yield better than 
ninety-eight percent of the total molecular energy for a small 
molecule. Now a quantitative approximation with less than two per-
cent error would be eminently satisfactory in many applications. But it 
isn't necessarily good enough for chemistry. 
To see why not, consider what we want to predict. We certainly 
want to be able to predict chemical bonding. How would that be 
done? Well, the most stable arrangements of any physical system are 
those of lowest energy. If the energy of two atoms is lowered by bring-
ing them close together, they will tend to remain close together. That 
is what is meant by a bond. If, on the other hand, the energy is 
increased, they will tend to fly apart. So the formation of a chemical 
bond depends on the difference in energy between two atoms close 
together and two atoms far apart. The magnitude of the energy dif-
ference is precisely the bond strength. 
As an example, take diatomic fluorine , F2. The best restricted 
SCF total energy of two separated fluorine atoms is -198 .82 in conve-
nient units called hartree, which need not concern us here. The energy 
of the two atoms at a typical bond distance is -198 .77 in the same 
units. The energy has increased (become more positive or less 
negative) so the prediction is: no bond. 
This prediction is somewhat embarrassing, for F2 is a well-known 
molecule. Note that the two energies differ by only five in the fifth 
figure or -0.05; on that tiny difference hinges the prediction. But, if 
the restricted SCF approximation is only reliable to about two percent 
of the total energy, the numbers we are subtracting are probably only 
correct to about three figures at most. The residual error in the 
restricted SCF approximation has completely invalidated the predic-
tion . 
This is not an isolated example. In fact , we now know that the 
restricted SCF approximation is too simple an approximation to be 
quantitatively satisfactory for chemistry. Unfortunately, it is only con-
ceptually simple. Computationally, it is already fairly difficult to 
apply, requiring extensive use of computers, etc. Doing better inev-
itably means doing even more work. 
The most straightforward approach for doing better is what 
might be called the "brute force approach." It is possible to prove that 
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the restricted SCF approximation can be viewed as merely the first 
level of approximation in anyone of a number of convergent approx-
imate solution methods. The brute force approach says that if the first 
level isn't sufficient, proceed to the second level, or to the third, or 
however far it takes. Eventually, chemical bonding, or any other 
phenomenon for that matter, must fall out. 
The trouble with the brute force approach is that it appears to be 
hopeless. Consider the F2 example. If differences in the fifth figure of 
the total energy are the source of bonding, the level of approximation 
must be increased until both total energies are accurate to better than 
five figures . The fact that we cannot predict precisely what level that 
will be is a minor problem, which can be solved with experience. The 
major problem is that we are talking about at least one hundred times 
more accuracy than the restricted SCF approximation. One must be 
cautious in issuing pronouncements, but there seems to be no possibil-
ity in the foreseeable future of achieving this level of accuracy for any 
but the smallest molecules. Even if it could be achieved, it wouldn't 
suffice, for there are phenomena we want to predict that would 
require yet more accuracy. Two neon atoms don't form a normal 
chemical bond, but they do form a very weak van der Waals bond. To 
predict that at all, we would need something like two hundred times 
more accuracy still . 
What do we really want? We don't want an exact solution of the 
Schrodinger equation; we want to predict chemical phenomena. To 
be sure, if we had an exact solution, we could make predictions, but 
we would settle for any level of approximation that gave the same 
predictions. Now it is clear that no approximation can reproduce all 
the predictions of the exact solution, but for some specific 
phenomenon it might be possible to devise a low level approximation 
that gave correct predictions. Unfortunately, even if it is possible, 
there are no straightforward mathematical techniques, no guaranteed 
methods, to guide us. We have to fall back on intuitz"on. 
Now falling back on intuition is admittedly a risky proposition. 
The unreliability of our intuition in the atomic realm has already been 
noted. Nevertheless, an intuitive approach seems to be the only way to 
make significant progress, and significant progress is already being 
made in just this way. Here is how intuition has been applied to the 
problem of chemical bonding. \ 
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The periodic table is periodic because different atoms may have 
similar properties. Fluorine and chlorine have different numbers of 
electrons (nine and seventeen respectively) but similar chemistry. 
Therefore, not all of the electrons can be equally important in 
chemical bonding. Of course, chemists have known this for a long 
time; the concept of a covalent bond as a shared electron pair ignores 
the other electrons. Chemists introduced the name valence electrons to 
denote those electrons that appear to playa major role in bonding. To 
translate these observations into quantum chemistry terms, it seems 
reasonable to assume that only the valence electrons need to be 
described accurately in order to predict bonding. 
Again consider F2 • The fluorine atom has one unpaired electron, 
so from the simplest viewpoint, F2 is held together by a single electron 
pair covalent bond. The simplest step beyond restricted SCF then con-
sists of increasing the level of approximation for just that pair. The 
treatment of all (sixteen) other electrons remains at a restricted SCF 
level. Now it c~n be shown that such treatment of the other electrons 
undoubtedly introduces large errors. But the assumption is that if 
these electrons are unimportant in bonding, whatever errors are com-
mitted in describing the behavior of these electrons will be the same 
whether the two fluorine atoms are close together or far apart . When 
the energy difference between the two arrangements of atoms is com-
puted, these large errors should very nearly cancel out. 
As a technical aside, let me indicate how the level of approxima-
tion for a pair of electrons can be increased. One very common 
method is to describe the pair by more than the minimum number of 
orbitals. To see how this works, suppose one electron is partially 
described by an orbital that gives a high probability of finding the 
electron say, in close to a nucleus. The other electron may at the same 
time be described by orbitals, some of which give a high probability of 
finding that electron far from the nucleus, hence far from the first 
electron. In this way, electron-electron interaction within a pair can 
be accounted for in detail, which is just a fancy way of saying that the 
two electrons can be kept apart better. 
Now to return to F2 and the crucial question: Can bonding be 
obtained with a low level approximation? The answer is yes. IS Improv-
ing the description of the bonding pair by just one orbital beyond 
restricted SCF leads to the prediction of a stable molecule. Quan-
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titatively, however, the predicted bond strength is still pretty poor-
less than half of the experimental value. To do better, it is necessary to 
realize that the fluorine atom really has five valence electrons. In addi-
tion to the unpaired electron, there are four others that behave 
similarly. Indeed, all five are described by equivalent orbitals in the 
restricted SCF approximation. Even though only one of them (the 
unpaired one) is primarily involved in bonding, bond formation may 
substantially alter the behavior of the other four; hence, errors in the 
description of this behavior may not cancel out. If the level of approx-
imation is increased for these electrons as well , a bond strength within 
a few percent of experiment is obtained. Note that eight electrons are 
still being described only at the restricted SCF level. And note 
especially that the total energies are improved hardly at all ; they are' 
still accurate only to about three figures. To reiterate, the only way 
this approach can work is for the errors between the third and fifth 
figures to cancel in taking the difference in energy between two atoms 
far apart and two atoms close together. The actual calculations con-
firm our intuitive feeling that such cancellations can be built into a 
carefully chosen, low level approximation. 
A more difficult example is diatomic nitrogen, N2 • The nitrogen 
atom has three unpaired electrons, giving three electron pair bonds (a 
triple bond) in the molecule. The level of approximation for all six 
electrons must be increased in a mutually consistent way if the crucial 
cancellation of errors is to arise. One of the most thorough applica-
tions of this approach to diatomic nitrogen predicted about eighty-
seven percent of the experimental bond strength. 16 So the approach 
isn't perfect, but it does allow chemically relevant predictions to be 
made in a finite amount of time with a finite amount of money. 
The substitution of intuition for brute force can be applied in the 
prediction of phenomena other than chemical bonding. A colleague 
and I recently attempted to calculate the energy required to remove 
the extra electron from the lithium hydride anion, LiH-Y Removing 
the extra electron gives the neutral lithium hydride molecule, LiH, so 
the removal energy is precisely the difference in total energy between 
anion and neutral. The extra electron can exist in several states, and 
for one state we computed an energy difference that was only about 
one one-hundred-thousandth of the total energy of either molecule. 
That is, the total energies only differed in the sixth figure; and at our 
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level of approximation, neither total energy could be expected to be 
accurate much beyond the second figure . Nevertheless, we were able 
to obtain a (I hope) reliable difference by a judicious choice of 
approximation, which insured maximum cancellation of error. How 
good is our prediction? I don't know. No one has done an experimen-
tal measurement of the removal energy yet. 
This leads naturally into my last topic, which is, Why do we care 
what the Schrodinger equation is telling us? Is it mere intellectual 
curiosity? No, there are compelling practical reasons. We want to 
understand what the Schrodinger equation is telling us because that 
information is useful. We may need to understand the behavior of 
molecules in the upper atmosphere, interstellar space, or during an 
explosion, perhaps. Many exotic molecules that exist in these envi-
ronments are hard to study in the laboratory because duplicating the 
extreme conditions of these environments is very difficult and expen-
sive. If we could predict the behavior of these molecules, it would be 
far less time consuming and much less expensive as well. 
There are other cases when theoretical calculations appear to 
provide not just an alternative method for obtaining the desired 
answer but the only method. For example, in order for two molecules 
to react with one another and form new molecules, they must be 
brought close together. Usually, there is an energy barrier or "hill" 
that must be surmounted before a reaction can occur. The late Henry 
Eyring showed that from a knowledge of the height of this barrier, the 
rate of reaction could be predicted. The rate of a reaction is very 
important information, especially if we hope to use the reaction for 
manufacturing purposes. Unfortunately, the top of an energy hill is 
not a stable arrangement of the atoms. Consequently, it is very hard to 
conceive of a direct experimental method for determining the barrier 
height. Of course, if we measured the rate, we might be able to work 
backward to get the barrier height, but the rate is what we want to 
predict. Fortunately, the Schrodinger equation can be used to predict 
the energy of an unstable arrangement of atoms just as well as a stable 
one. There seems to be no experimental alternative in this case. 
Not all attempts to understand what the Schrodinger equation is 
telling us are motivated by such practical considerations. Many 
attempts are indeed made for the sole purpose of satisfying mere intel-
lectual curiosity. The use of "mere" in this context has decidely 
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negative connotations. In this era of economic hardship and shrinking 
research budgets, the value of such research may seem questionable. 
But attempting to understand what the Schr6dinger equation is telling 
us is really a way of asking, What is the world like? We believe that the 
Schrodinger equation is the rule of behavior of an atom, and we 
. believe that atoms are the basic building blocks of the world. 
Therefore, it seems to me that we ought to attempt to find out what 
the Schrodinger equation has to say for the same reason that we would 
seek the counsel of a wise and respected, but rather cryptic, 
philosopher, or religious leader, or poet. What is the world like? seems 
to be a fundamental human question. I'm no anthropologist , but I 
would guess that almost all cultures have belief systems that attempt to 
supply answers to that question. In our culture, science is one such 
belief system, and trying to understand what the Schrodinger equation 
is telling us is part of the ritual. 
Nevertheless, the Schrodinger equation isn't dogma , not even for 
chemistry. If it ever fails to predict the behavior of chemical 
phenomena, it can and will be replaced. We don't believe this is likely 
to happen at any time in the near future , but it might, and some years 
from now another theoretical chemist may be presenting an honor lec-
ture about understanding what the strange new rules of chemistry are 
telling us . If so , the introduction of the lecture is sure to contain a sec-
tion harking back nostalgically to the good old days of 1982 when the 
rules of chemistry were as simple as 
A'V=~ c3'V 
2n c3t 
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